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ABSTRACT
Background Tobacco companies use a host of strategies to undermine public health efforts directed to reduce and eliminate smoking.
The success, failure and trends in domestic litigation used by tobacco companies to undermine tobacco control are not well understood, with
commentators often assuming disputes are trade related or international in nature. We analyse domestic legal disputes involving tobacco
companies and public health actors in high-income countries across the last decade to ascertain the types of action and the success or failure of
cases, develop effective responses.
Methods WorldLii, a publicly available online law repository, was used to identify domestic court cases involving tobacco companies from 2004
to 2014, while outcome data from LexisNexis and Westlaw databases were used to identify appeals and trace case history.
Results We identified six domestic cases in the UK, Australia and Canada, noting that the tobacco industry won only one of six cases; a win later
usurped by legislative reform and a further court case. Nevertheless, we found cases involve significant resource costs for governments, often
progressing across multiple jurisdictional levels.
Discussion We suggest that, in light of our results, while litigation takes up significant time and incurs legal costs for health ministries,
policymakers must robustly fend off suggestions that litigation wastes taxpayers’ money, pointing to the good prospects of winning such legal
battles.
Keywords global health, governance, law, litigation, tobacco
Introduction
Tobacco corporations manufacture and distribute products
that, when used as intended, will kill half their users.1
Tobacco control measures typically seek to reduce smoking
initiation, especially in children, and promote cessation
among users.2 Effective measures, set out in the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), include restrictions
on marketing and availability, requirements to provide infor-
mation, such as health warnings, and measures to increase
price and regulate composition.3 Recent reports suggest that
at least 2.3 billion people are covered by at least one tobacco
control measure.4 While the majority of the world’s govern-
ments are signatories to the FCTC, most still have far to go to
implement these policies.5
One reason for this slow progress is because tobacco com-
panies aggressively seek to thwart these public health efforts;
tactics which the parties to the FCTC now consider its greatest
barrier to implementation.6,7 For example, tobacco companies
support misleading research8,9 and devote vast resources to
lobbying against any legislation that might reduce their sales.10–12
They develop elaborate public relation campaigns, emphasiz-
ing personal choice and individual responsibility. In some
cases, they even write the legislation.13 Where legislation is
Sarah L. Steele, Lecturer in Global Health
Anna B. Gilmore, Professor of Public Health
Martin McKee, Professor of European Public Health
David Stuckler, Professor of Political Economy and Sociology
# The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Faculty of Public Health.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Journal of Public Health | Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 516–521 | doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdv068 | Advance Access Publication June 1, 2015
516
2015.
passed that challenges their interests, they seek legal remedies
to prevent, or at the very least delay, the implementation or
continued application of these laws.14
Although actions brought by Big Tobacco under investor-
state dispute mechanisms and arbitration frameworks have
been discussed extensively,11,15,16 there has been less attention
to its actions in domestic courts. Here we explore the indus-
try’s use of litigation from 2004 to 2014 in high-income
countries that have ratiﬁed the FCTC, including an evaluation
of types of claims pursued and an account of their success
or failure.
Methods
To identify litigation strategies of major tobacco companies
in domestic contexts, we searched WorldLii,17 a free-to-use,
non-commercial, independent legal database. Unlike other
databases compiled by not-for-proﬁts that are often issue
focused and therefore subject to selection bias, WorldLii inte-
grates over 270 databases from 48 legal jurisdictions and is
used by lawyers in both developed and developing settings for
routine legal research. It is the largest, most jurisdictionally
diverse database of domestic case law text available to legal
researchers, although it does not index cases or provide details
of case history. Therefore, we matched the cases WorldLii
identiﬁed to LexisNexis18 and Westlaw,19 both online legal re-
search databases available via paid subscription, which index
and track the history of cases, providing any updates. In
concert, these databases enabled us to evaluate the cause of
action, type of law applied, and whether and how tobacco
companies achieved their objectives through litigation.
Our search ﬁrst applied the terms ‘tobacco’ and ‘public
health’ to the WorldLii case law database, which automatically
excluded statute, regulation and international law documents.
This yielded 459 results, of which the case names indicated
irrelevance, especially cases of individuals charged with tobacco
consumption related offences. We manually excluded results
if they did not (i) involve a tobacco industry party opposing
a public health action; (ii) involve a decision that was purely
procedural; and (iii) took place in a non-FCTC jurisdiction.
We consolidated daily hearings, original hearing and appellate
judgments, leaving a total of six judgments for review.
In determining the subsequent history of these judgments,
we used LexisNexis and Westlaw to identify whether a case
had been appealed, and if so, whether it was upheld or over-
turned, fully or in part. These databases also allowed us to de-
termine whether the parties were involved in a related, but
separate, case. The following information was extracted for
each case: (i) the case name and reference; (ii) the jurisdiction;
(iii) the cause of action; (iv) the question/s of law; (v) whether
the decision was in favour of or against the tobacco industry;
and (vi) the ratio decidendi (e.g. the legal decision). A narrative
synthesis approach was used to evaluate the data, given that
the qualitative nature of the ﬁndings did not permit a
meta-analytic approach.
Results
All six cases meeting the inclusion criteria relied on Public
Law, considering Constitutional or Human Rights Law. These
cases took place in the UK, Australia and Canada. We review
each in turn.
UK
The UK has no written constitution, so legal claims have pro-
ceeded under the legal and political bases that form the UK
Constitution, including European Law. Cases have considered
whether primary or secondary legislation is compatible with
European law, as well as the legislation on devolution to
Scotland.
In the case British American Tobacco UK Ltd & Ors, R (on the
application of ) v Secretary of State for Health [2004] EWHC 2493
(Admin) UK, the tobacco industry challenged the legality of
England’s Tobacco Advertising and Promotion (Point of Sale)
Regulations 2004. The case took place in the High Court, in-
volving a single bench judicial review. Tobacco parties claimed
that the tobacco advertising regulations were not proportion-
ate. European Law on proportionality requires that the
measure is in pursuit of a legitimate aim; the measure be suit-
able to achieve the aim; the measure be necessary to achieve
the aim and the measure be reasonable.20,21 In this case, it
invoked several questions: are the Regulations disproportion-
ate to the aim of promoting health because they allow only so
limited an amount of advertisement at point of sale as to
impair the ‘very essence’ of commercial free speech? Are the
Regulations disproportionate because they amount to ‘too
blunt an instrument’ to meet the perceived objective? And,
therefore, do the Regulations infringe the laws of the
European Union? Is there adequate evidence to show that the
Secretary of State properly assessed for himself whether less
severe regulations would be sufﬁcient for his purposes?
The Court drew on several matters of EU Law, including
decisions of national courts and the European Court of
Justice. The Court found against the tobacco parties on the
basis that the proportionality test was indeed satisﬁed. His
Honour Justice McCombe accepted that the Health Minister
had assessed for himself whether less severe regulations
would not have satisﬁed the legislative purpose, and therefore,
that the Minister had fulﬁlled the test.
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Another UK case, Sinclair Collis Ltd, R (on the application of )
v Secretary of State for Health & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 437,
involved judicial review of compatibility of primary and sec-
ondary legislation with EU Law. The Court was asked
whether to impugn sections 22 and 23 of the Health Act 2009
and the Protection from Tobacco (Sales from Vending Machines)
Regulations 2010 on the basis that they violated the principle of
proportionality. On this occasion, the Court found, in a 2-1
judgment, that the public health justiﬁcation was proportion-
ate and therefore against the tobacco industry party Sinclair
Collis Ltd, the largest provider of tobacco dispensing solu-
tions in the UK. The ban was deemed justiﬁable by reference
to the wide margin of appreciation that the principle afforded
to the Government. Lady Justice Arden stated ‘. . . in the
context of public health protection, European Union law
without doubt permits a low level of intensity of review with
respect to the acts of the national legislature’ [173]. However,
Lord Justice Laws dissented, considering the prohibition to
be disproportionate, identifying a less restrictive alternative
that might have been used.
Scottish courts heard Collis v The Lord Advocate [2012]
ScotCS CSIH_80, wherein tobacco parties claimed Section 9
of the Tobacco and Primary Medical Services (Scotland) Act 2010
was incompatible with EU law on free movement of goods.
The plaintiff, a wholly owned subsidiary of Imperial Tobacco,
asked whether it was within the powers of the Scottish
Parliament to prohibit the sales of tobacco from vending
machines, asking whether restrictions were proportionate in
terms of European Law. The Court found against the tobacco
industry, ﬁnding that the measure was not disproportionate in
Convention terms, as the prohibition struck a balance
between the public interest in maintaining good public health
and the petitioners’ private economic interest in its use
of vending machines and therefore was valid according to
European Law.
In Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate (Scotland) [2012]
UKSC 61 UK, the tobacco industry relied on another area of
UK Constitutional Law, seeking to contest the compatibility
of the Tobacco and Primary Medical Services (Scotland) Act 2010
with Scottish devolution legislation. The case involved a chal-
lenge to both sections 1 and 9 of the Act as being outside the
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. The Court
again found against the industry, concluding the Act was well
within the competence of the Scottish Parliament.
Australia
The tobacco industry also failed in JT International SA v
Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43. This case consid-
ered whether Section 15 of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act
2011 (Cth) resulted in an acquisition of any property of the
plaintiffs otherwise than on just terms in violation of Section
51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The High Court found there had
been no ‘acquisition’ of ‘property’, and therefore, that the
Commonwealth succeeded on this point. Importantly, the
plaintiffs were ordered to pay the Commonwealth’s costs in
this case.
Canada
The result was similar in Canada. In Canada (Attorney General)
v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, 2007 SCC 30, the
Court unanimously upheld new federal advertising restric-
tions in their entirety. However, this case stood in stark con-
trast to RJR-MacDonald Inc v Attorney General of Canada [1995]
ICHRL 51, a decision over a decade earlier in which the
tobacco industry also relied on human rights law to argue that
the similar provisions in the Tobacco Products Control Act, S.C.
1988 infringed the right to freedom of expression. In this
earlier case, the industry party argued that the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed by the legisla-
tion’s banning of certain advertising and requiring unattribut-
able health warnings, as such an infringement was not
justiﬁable. In this case, the Courts struck down some provi-
sions of the Act, thereby favouring the industry, ﬁnding that
while the legislation validly enacted these provisions it did
indeed violate the right to freedom of expression. Thus, sec-
tions 4–6 and 8–9 were unjustiﬁed and therefore inoperable.
The Canadian Parliament responded by enacting new
restrictions on tobacco advertising. The new Act was similar
to its predecessor, but addressed the issues raised in the
earlier case. However, the tobacco industry promptly chal-
lenged it on the same grounds. In the 2007 case, the Court
unanimously upheld the new federal advertising restrictions
in their entirety. There were some crucial differences between
these cases. In 2007, unlike 1995, the Attorney General pro-
duced voluminous evidence on the harm caused by tobacco
and the role of advertising in youth initiation. Chief Justice
McLachlin noted that this evidence was a signiﬁcant factor in
reaching her judgment, but also that this did not relieve the
government of its obligation to justify the measures. She con-
cluded, along with the majority, that the provisions were to be
upheld. The result was, in effect, to overturn the tobacco
industry’s 1995 victory, but not to overturn the previous case.
Discussion
Main findings of this study
Increasing legislation to tackle the health effects of tobacco
has led the industry to challenge its legality. We documented
six domestic cases meeting our inclusion criteria spanning
2004–14, identifying how the dominant cause of action has
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been founded in Public Law, speciﬁcally Constitutional and
Human Rights Law, rather than International or Private Law
on trade.
While we did not focus on mapping full case histories, in-
cluding procedural hearings, we note that legal disputes could
result in multiple procedural and pre-trial hearings, as well as
appeals across multiple jurisdictional levels in federal states like
Canada and Australia. In almost all cases, the action centred on
testing the compatibility of laws and regulations with docu-
ments that are either constitutions or have similar primacy over
primary and secondary legislation. This is unsurprising as ﬁnd-
ings of incompatibility with primary legislation can relatively
easily be addressed by amending legislation, whereas it is much
more difﬁcult to amend constitutions and the like.
What is already known on this topic
Commentators often focus on tobacco companies’ use of
private and international law to prevent or delay implementa-
tion of public health reforms. Much of the existing literature
documents Big Tobacco’s use of Investor-state dispute settle-
ment (ISDS) and arbitration mechanisms.22 This literature
critiques the expansion of such dispute mechanisms on the
basis that they take place in secret, rather than in open national
courts, with decisions made by individuals who need not be
legally trained. The relevant decision-making bodies are not
constrained by precedent, and while they must not do any-
thing that is clearly illegal, they do not reach decisions primar-
ily on the basis of legislation or jurisprudence. This means
that they are, prima facie, less likely to respect the safeguards
for public health contained within much legislation and that
outcomes are far less certain.16 The backgrounds of those
involved may also lead them to frame disputes primarily as
trade matters, with little understanding of what a health
framing might look like.
The existing literature focuses on bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements currently being negotiated that will increase
the opportunities for ISDS and other arbitration processes.23
The negotiations are being conducted largely in secret, and
there are serious concerns that they will increase the scope for
industries producing harmful products to challenge govern-
ments seeking to reduce consumption of their products, or as
the industries will frame it, appropriating their property rights,
whether to trade-marked images or future revenue streams.24
The prospect for simultaneous domestic and international
action by tobacco parties is therefore increasing.
What this study adds
It is crucial that governments be aware that the litigation, arbi-
tration and public relation strategies adopted by industry are
intertwined. The new generation of regional trade agreements,
such as Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) and the proposed Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP),
pose signiﬁcant implications for tobacco litigation, and the
potential to increase costs around defending public health
measures generally.25 Alongside domestic litigation, such
developments mark signiﬁcant issues for government,
however on the domestic front victory public health provi-
sions usually prevail. Governments must be prepared to fend
off accusations that costly litigation wastes taxpayers’ money
by pointing to the good prospects of success.
Our review also shows that governments must draw on ex-
pertise of those in diverse areas of law, not just trade law and
arbitration, who are involved in policymaking as well as
dispute processes. What is clear is that those governments
regulating to reduce non-communicable diseases must expect
to face simultaneous disputes in national and international
fora, but that with the right expertise and effective use of the
evidence, such disputes can be won.
Our results show that the tobacco industry rarely succeeds,
with only one victory in 1995, undone by later law reform in
Canada. Such results raise the question of why the industry
engages in such litigation. One possibility is that it values the
threat of litigation. Litigation is extremely complex and costly,
in time and resources, for governments involved.26 The threat
of litigation is likely to weigh heavily on governments of small,
poorly resourced countries that will struggle to prepare a
defence against a well-resourced transnational corporation.
However, this review should encourage such governments to
ignore industry threats, drawing on the persuasive precedent
of these existing disputes in common law countries.
A second possibility is that litigation is a means to delay the
implementation of legislation. In this respect, it would simply
be a continuation of other tactics used by the industry, such as
those employed to slow the passage of the European Union’s
2014 Tobacco Products Directive9 and its 2001 predecessor.27
Litigation has the additional advantage of diverting the atten-
tion of the few tobacco control experts in a country. Yet there
are risks in litigation for the industry. First, it is also costly for
it, consuming time and money. Although the transnational
tobacco companies have access to resources far in excess of
health ministries, these resources are not unlimited and they
must calculate how best to deploy them. Second, there is the
danger that they may be forced to reveal information they
would rather conceal during the process of disclosure, as
happened when an advisor to the tobacco industry sued for
libel in a Swiss court.8 Third, although now much less of a
problem than in the past when the industry was still able to
portray itself as being socially responsible, there is the danger
of reputational risk, as happened in the notorious McLibel
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case where McDonalds won in the court of law but lost
heavily in the court of public opinion.28
The use of Public Law is likely to continue, if not expand.
Regulating tobacco products reveals a tension within the ever-
growing ﬁeld of human rights between the public interest and
rights to private property and corporate freedom of expres-
sion. Such a conﬂict requires the courts to consider and weigh
these rights; a point made most obviously in the UK cases
where the test of proportionality is applied. Both at a philo-
sophical level, where such a debate reveals the tension
between human rights and neo-liberal ideology, and at a prac-
tical level, where corporations take on democratically elected
governments, the issue of how far governments can or must
go to protect the public interest sits central. It is therefore
crucial that governments continue to defend public health
action in these disputes to set precedent that is persuasive in
other national level courts. This impact of fending off these
disputes is no longer just nationally signiﬁcant, but inter-
nationally relevant.
Limitations of this study
The nature of legal databases precluded undertaking a fully
systematic review or quantitatively assessing successes and
failures on a global scale. In using WorldLii, we only search
jurisdictions covered by the database, which was selected
because of its ability to be used freely by those in both devel-
oped and developing settings. The database is not fully com-
prehensive, but as yet no legal database covers every legal
jurisdiction across the world. Other databases maintained by
issues-based not-for-proﬁts like www.tobaccocontrollaws.org
are cultivated and therefore subject to selection bias in routine
searching and reporting.
We also limited our study to jurisdictions that have ratiﬁed
the FCTC. This decision was a practical one, as not only did
WorldLii cover these jurisdictions, but we also knew these
countries had made formal commitments and would be the
most likely sites of reform. This leaves other countries, includ-
ing the USAwith its many jurisdictions, as ripe sites for future
research on the use of public law.
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